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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 SAN SALVADOR 3775

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, SHUM, ES
SUBJ: SECURITY ASSISTANCE - FIRST ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSES-
SMENT

REF: (A) STATE 167901, (B) STATE 168320, (C) STATE 182987

FOLLOWING IS "INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY
ASSISTANCE" FOR EL SALVADOR, WHICH ADHERES AS CLOSELY AS
POSSIBLE TO FORMAT PROVIDED IN REFERENCED INSTRUCTIONS,
BUT DEVIATES SOMEWHAT (ESPECIALLY IN PARA 13) SINCE CUR-
RENT SECURITY ASSISTANCE LEVEL CS BELOW MINIMUM LEVEL.

1. U.S. INTERESTS -- U.S. INTERESTS TO BE SERVED BY SEC-
URITY ASSISTANCE RELATE PRINCIPALLY TO "OUR LARGER CONCERNS
FOR REGIONAL STABILITY". IMPROVED HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVANCE,
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, TRADE PROMOTION, SETTLEMENT OF
THE HONDURAN-SALVADORAN BORDER DISPUTE, AND ENHANCED BI-
LATERAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE ANCILLARY OBJECTIVES TO WHICH
U.S. MILITARY PROGRAMS CAN CONTRIBUTE, PRINCIPALLY THROUGH
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PERSONAL CONTACTS, PERSUASION, AND OTHER NON-RESOURCE IN-
PUTS. AN IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE IS MAIN-
TENANCE OF U.S. MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE SALVADORAN
MILITARY, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT IS THE COUNTRY'S SINGLE MOST
IMPORTANT POLITICAL FORCE. WITH THE MARCH 1977 RENUNCIATION
OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE BY EL SALVADOR, U.S. MILITARY ABILITY
TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE IS AT A MINIMUM. THE MILITARY

GROUP IS PRESENTLY AT AN AUTHORIZED LEVEL OF THREE OFFICERS, AND IS PREPARED TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH EL SALVADOR'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WITH THE HELP OF "A MODEST SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP INVOLVING CASH SALES OF DEFENSE ARTICLES AND DEFENSE SERVICES", ESPECIALLY THAT "NEEDED BY EL SALVADOR TO MAINTAIN EQUIPMENT PREVIOUSLY ACQUIRED FROM THE U.S.", WITH "REQUESTS FOR PURCHASES" TO BE "REVIEWED ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS". (QUOTES FROM THE FY 1978 CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION -- SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.) IN FACT, PROGRAMS APPROVED SINCE THE RENUNCIATION HAVE BEEN INSIGNIFICANT AND A NUMBER OF REQUESTS FOR PURCHASES ARE HELD UP AT WASHINGTON LEVEL. IN ORDER TO BE ABLE EFFECTIVELY TO USE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AS A MEANS FOR ACHIEVING U.S. OBJECTIVES AND SERVING U.S. INTERESTS, THE U.S. SHOULD BE PREPARED TO APPROVE THESE REQUESTS AND TO RE-NEW A MODEST IMET AND FMS CREDIT PROGRAM SHOULD EL SALVADOR REQUEST IT, AND IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION SO WARRANTS.

2. STATEMENT OF THREAT -TZOST COUNTRY PRECEPTION -

A. GOES PERCEIVES A MULTI-FACETED INTERNAL THREAT FROM,
(1) AN ARRAY OF EXTREME LEFTIST ORGANIZATIONS CAPABLE OF TERRORIST ACTS AND HAVING A REVOLUTIONAL POTENTIAL;
(2) DISSATISFIED LABOR, UNIVERSITY STUDENT, AND PEASANT GROUPS AND A CRITICAL CATHOLIC CHURCH;
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(3) A GENERALLY WEAK AND DISORGANIZED, BUT NEVERTHELESS NETTLING, POLITICAL OPPOSITION;
(4) A GROWING NUMBER OF DISGRUNTLED MILITARY OFFICERS;
(5) FRIGHTENED ELEMENTS OF THE WEALTHY ELITE CAPABLE OF COLLUSION WITH ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY TO STAGE A COUP, AND CAPABLE AS WELL OF DEVELOPING THEIR OWN COUNTERTERRORIST PROGRAM.H

B. HOST COUNTRY STRATEGIS TO DEAL WITH INTERNAL THREAT:

(1) SECURITY FORCES UNDER ORDERS TO COUNTER, WITHIN PROVISIONS OF LAW, ANY CRIMINAL ACT OR THREAT TO PUBLIC ORDER AND TO THE STATE, COMING FROM THE GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS PERCEIVED AS THREATS, WHILE THE GOES ATTEMPTS TO ESCHEW PRESSURES ESPECIALLY FROM WITHIN ITS OWN RANKS AND FROM THE WEALTHY ELITE TO TAKE STRONGER THOUGH PROBABLY ILLEGAL COUNTERMEASURES FRAUGHT WITH LIKELY VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

(2) A NEW LAW OF DEFENSE AND GUARANTEE OF PUBLIC ORDER PROMULGATED IN NOVEMBER 1977 WHICH PROVIDES A LEGAL BASIS FOR NECESSARY ACTION, BUT OF ITSELF A SOURCE OF INCREASING CRITICISMS OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT.

(3) A FIVE-YEAR PLAN, BACKED BY EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE,

FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOR FAMILY PLANNING AND OTHER MEASURES TO RELIEVE POPULATION PRESSURE.

C. THESE STRATEGIES HAVE SO FAR BEEN RELATIVELY INEFFECTIVE IN REDUCING THE THREATS, WHICH MEANWHILE HAVE INCREASED, WHILE THE GOVERNMENT IS IN THE DILEMMA OF FURTHER EXACERBATING THE THREATS ALMOST ANY WAY IT TURNS.

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D. HOST COUNTRY PERCEIVED EXTERNAL THREAT: GOES PERCEIVES HONDURAS AS EL SALVADOR'S MAJOR EXTERNAL THREAT. THE CURRENT BORDER NEGOTIATION AND GOES' WIDELY RUMORED HARDLINE STANCE BASED ON HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS COULD JEOPARDIZE BOTH THE BORDER DEMARCATION TALKS AND THE NINE-YEAR OLD CEASEFIRE. HONDURAN CLAIM TO ALL GULF OF FONSECA ISLANDS WOULD SURELY RESULT IN RENEWED HOSTILITIES OF AT LEAST MINOR MAGNITUDE. GOES IS ALSO PREOCCUPIED WITH A PERCEIVED THREAT OF CUBAN INTERVENTION AND BELIEVES THERE IS CUBAN SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST SUBVERSION. FINALLY, EXPULSION OF ILLEGAL SALVADORAN IMMIGRANTS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES (ESPECIALLY GUATEMALA) WOULD PLACE AN UNBEARABLE STRAIN ON EL SALVADOR'S ALREADY OVERCROWDED LAND MASS. THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES, IF THEY WERE EQUIPPED WITH UPGRADED ARMORED VEHICLES AND MODERNIZED AIR POWER, WOULD PROBABLY BE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING THE BORDERS IN THE EVENT OF ATTACK. ALTHOUGH EL SALVADOR'S MILITARY GROUND FORCE IS IN A RELATIVELY HIGHER STATE OF READINESS THAN THE ADVERSARY, IT

WOULD NOT BE CAPABLE OF AN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN. THE SALVADORAN
AIR FORCE IS PLAGUED BY AN AGING INVENTORY, RELATED MAINTENANCE
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PROBLEMS, AN INCREASING SHORTAGE OF PILOTS, AND WOULD BE COM-
PLETELY OUTCLASSED BY THE HONDURAN AIR FORCE.

3. U.S. PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT - THE EXTERNAL THREAT IS ESSENT-
IALLY AS PERCEIVED BY THE SALVADORAN GOVERNMENT. ITS PER-
CEPTION OF THE INTERNAL THREAT IS PROBABLY ALSO CORRECT, SINCE
IT IS UNFORTUNATELY TRUE, AND TO A GREAT EXTENT, UNNECESSARY,
THAT THE GOES IS POTENTIALLY THREATENED FROM ALMOST ALL SECTORS
OF THE SOCIETY. ALTHOUGH THERE IS INDEED A STRONG AND GROW-
ING THREAT FROM LEFTIST EXTREMIST GROUPS, THE GOVERNMENT, ESPEC-
IALLY THE SECURITY FORCES, (AND THE WEALTHY ELITE, IN PER-
PETUAL MEMORY OF THE 1932 PEASANT UPRISING, SEES COMMUNISM
IN ALMOST ALL OPPOSITION, AND TENDS TO LUMP TOGETHER LABOR STUDENT,
PEASANT AND POLITICAL GROUPS NOT UNDER ITS CONTROL, AS WELL
AS THE CHURCH, WITH THE EXTREME LEFTIST MARXIST-LENINIST TERROR-
IST THREAT. THE GOVERNMENT'S LACK OF CONCERN OVER THE IMPACT OF
ITS OWN MONOLITHIC APPROACH TO SOCIETY, THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE
ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY AND INCENTIVE FOR DISSENT AND BROAD-BASED
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT, AND THE FAILURE MEAS-
URABLY TO IMPROVE THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION, ARE FACTORS
WHICH FEED THE LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY THREAT AND INCREASE DISSENT
AND OPPOSITION FROM OTHER ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY, PREVENTING THE
GOVERNMENT FROM SUCCESSFULLY ISOLATING THE TRULY PRO-COMMUNIST
REVOLUTIONARY THREAT. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONTINUED FAILURE TO PREVENT
TERRORIST ACTS OR TO IDENTIFY AND APPREHEND THOSE GUILTY OF SUCH
ACTS CAUSES EVEN ITS CLOSEST SUPPORTERS AND LOYAL ADHERENTS
TO DOUBT ITS CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH THE INTERNAL THREAT, OR
EVEN TO GOVERN. BY CONTINUING TO FLOUNDER IN ITS EFFORTS TO RE-
DUCE TERRORIST ACTS, THE GOES ALLOWS SUSPICIONS TO CONTINUE AND
GROW THAT ELEMENTS WITHIN IT ARE, IN FACT, THE PERPETRATORS
OF OR ACCOMPLICES IN THE TERRORIST ACTS. SURVIVAL OF THE CURRENT
GOVERNMENT WILL LIKELY BE CONTINGENT UPON:

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A. DEVELOPMENT OF AN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICE
CAPABILITY TO BRING THOSE GUILTY OF TERRORISM TO THE COURTS
RESULTING IN THEIR CONVICTION;

B. SUCCESS IN ALLEVIATING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRESSES
ON THE SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO UNEMPLOYMENT AND
THE MALDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND WEALTH; AND

C. THE GOVERNMENT'S ESTABLISHING MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH NON-REVOLUTIONARY POLITICAL AND OTHER GROUPS AND THE CHURCH, RESULTING IN THEIR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT PROCESS.

4. THE GOES BELIEVES THAT THE BEST TYPE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT TO MEET THE COUNTRY'S REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE AN ARMED FORCE CLEARLY SUPERIOR TO ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA; HOWEVER, THEY REALIZE THAT REALITIES OF THE SITUATION WILL NOT ALLOW THAT TYPE OF FORCE. THE GOES BELIEVES THAT THEY MUST HAVE, AND INTENDS TO ACQUIRE, A FORCE SUPERIOR TO THAT OF HONDURAS. THEY ENVISION A GROUND FORCE SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT ONE WITH THE ADDITION OF APPROXIMATELY TEN TANKS WITH 90-120 MM GUNS, APPROXIMATELY FIVE ARMORED SCOUT CARS, IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AND FIVE TO TEN ADDITIONAL ARTILLERY TUBES. FOR THE AIR FORCE, THE GOES WOULD LIKE TO HAVE EIGHTEEN HIGH PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT OF THE F-5 OR SUPER MYSTERE CLASS, FIVE GROUND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT OF THE A-6 CLASS, AND AN ANTI-AIR RADAR CAPABILITY. THE NAVY WOULD REMAIN BASICALLY THE SAME WITH THE EXCEPTION OF POSSIBLY ADDING CANNONS TO THEIR THREE, 100 FOOT PATROL BOATS.

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5. THE FORCE DISCUSSED IN PARA 4 ABOVE WOULD GIVE EL SALVADOR SUPERIORITY FOR ATTACK IF DESIRED. IT WOULD ALSO LEAD

TO AN ACCELERATED ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND WOULD BE AN UNWARRANTED DRAIN ON THE ECONOMY OF EL SALVADOR. NONE OF THESE CONSEQUENCES IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE U.S. AS STATED IN PARA 2 ABOVE, THE HONDURAS ARMED FORCE IS PRESENTLY SUPERIOR TO THAT OF EL SALVADOR. IT WOULD BE IN U.S. INTEREST TO HAVE A BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN THE TWO TO PREVENT THE LIKELIHOOD OF HOSTILITIES SHOULD THE CURRENT BORDER TALKS BREAK DOWN. THIS CANNOT BE CONTROLLED BY THE U.S. UNLESS WE ARE SUPPLYING THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO BOTH SIDES. THE SALVADORAN AIR FORCE IS ANTIQUATED AND DIRE NEED OF MODERNIZING. GOES WOULD MUCH PREFER TO BUY U.S. EQUIPMENT, BUT REALISTICALLY PERCEIVES A NEED TO BUY ELSEWHERE IF REQUIRED. WITH AN INVENTORY OF TEN F-5 AIRCRAFT AND A RADAR CAPABILITY, THE AIR FORCE WOULD BE ON A NEAR PARITY WITH HONDURAS. THEY COULD BE CONVINCED TO REMAIN AT THAT LEVEL RATHER THAN FACE THE LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS OF A MIXED BAG OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT. THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE THE CAPABILITY FOR DEFENSE BUT NOT THE INCENTIVE FOR AN ATTACK.

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THE GROUND FORCE IS WITHOUT ARMORED VEHICLES IN FACE OF A HONDURAS FORCE WHICH RECENTLY COMPLETED A DEAL FOR ARMOR. TEN LIGHTLY ARMORED, HIGHLY MOBILE, WHEELED VEHICLES WOULD PROVIDED GOES WITH THE CAPABILITY TO BLOCK THE FEW NEGOTIABLE PASSES ON THE HONDURAN BORDER. AGAIN, THIS WOULD ENHANCE THE ABILITY FOR DEFENSE BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE THE POWER FOR ATTACK. THE NUMBER OF ARTILLERY PIECES IN THE CURRENT INVENTORY IS SUFFICIENT FOR DEFENSE, AND SALES SHOULD BE LIMITED TO REPLACEMENTS AS THEY WEAR OUT. WITH A SALES PROGRAM GEARED TO THE ABOVE FORCE, THE U.S. COULD MAINTAIN A BALANCE OF POWER. THE ALTERNATIVE WILL BE TO ALLOW INDISCRIMINATE PURCHASE OF ARMS FROM THIRD COUNTRIES AND FACE A POSSIBLE ACCELERATION OF AN ARMS RACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA.

6. DEFENSE SPENDING -- IN 1977, DEFENSE EXPENDITURES CONSTITUTED 5.3 PERCENT AND PUBLIC SECURITY EXPENDITURES 2.2 PERCENT OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES. 1978 ESTIMATES ARE 5.9 PERCENT AND 2.55 PERCENT. DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SECURITY COSTS, ALTHOUGH RISING IN ABSOLUTE TERMS, HAVE DECLINED RELATIVELY IN THE PAST FIVE YEARS WHILE SOCIAL INVESTMENT OVERHEAD HAS INCREASED. AS PERCENTAGES OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, THESE EXPENDITURES FOR 1977 WERE LESS THAN ONE PERCENT PER YEAR FOR DEFENSE AND 0.4 PERCENT PER YEAR FOR PUBLIC SECURITY EXPENDITURES DURING THE YEARS 1971-1976. THERE IS, HOWEVER, AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF EXPENDITURES FOR DEFENSE AND INTERNAL SECURITY HIDDEN IN OTHER SECTIONS OF THE BUDGET, ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENCY. MILITARY IMPORTS FOR THE YEARS 1971-1976 HAVE BEEN 0.3 PERCENT OF TOTAL IMPORTS (\$10.7 MILLION OUT OF \$3.2 BILLION), A RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT AMOUNT. GOES MILITARY EXPENDITURES WOULD PROBABLY INCREASE

SIGNIFICANTLY IN YEARS IN WHICH PAYMENTS WERE MADE ON PURCHASE OF SOPHISTICATED MILITARY AIRCRAFT, WHICH EL SALVADOR WISHES TO BUY. THERE ARE NO, OR ONLY INSIGNIFICANT, FOREIGN
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EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS AS A RESULT OF MILITARY IMPORTS.

7. N/A

8. N/A

9. N/A

10. ARMS CONTROL IMPACT -- SEE PARA 5.

11. HUMAN RIGHTS --

A. EL SALVADOR'S HUMAN RIGHTS POSTURE HAS SHOWN SOME IMPROVEMENT SINCE PRESIDENT CARLOS HUMBERTO ROMERO TOOK OFFICE ON JULY 1, 1977. THE STATE OF SIEGE IMPOSED IN FEBRUARY 1977 WAS LIFTED ON JULY AND HAS NOT BEEN REIMPOSED DESPITE NUMEROUS TERRORIST KIDNAPPINGS, ASSASSINATIONS, BOMBINGS AND OCCUPATIONS OF BOTH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND INSTITUTIONS. GOES HAD ALSO INVITED THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR INVESTIGATION IN EL SALVADOR AND RATIFIED THE INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (JUNE 15, 1978). GOES HAS ALSO EXHIBITED CONSIDERABLE RESTRAINT AS WELL AS INEPTITUDE IN FACE OF OVERT TERRORIST OPERATIONS.

B. GOES HAS DONE LITTLE TO INITIATE OR RESPOND TO DIALOGUES OR SEEK ACCOMMODATION WITH LEGITIMATE OPPONENTS SUCH AS CATHOLIC CHURCH AND OPPOSITION POLITICAL PARTIES. CONTINUING REPORTS OF VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, BOTH AGAINST HUMAN DIGNITY AND DEPRIVATION OF FREEDOM AND CIVIL RIGHTS ESPECIALLY IN RURAL AREAS, PRESENTLY SERVES TO INHIBIT OR PREVENT U.S. APPROVAL OF REQUESTS FOR ANY APPRECIABLE OR SIGNIFICANT AMOUNTS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE OR RESTORATION OF EITHER IMET OR FMSCR. ON THE OTHER HAND, A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH IMET AND FMSCR ENHANCES ABILITY
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TO INFLUENCE ATTITUDES TOWARD AND OBSERVANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS.

C. GOES SECURITY FORCES ARE, FOR MOST PART, POORLY EDUCATED.

TED, TRAINED AND EQUIPPED, PARTICULARLY IN AREA OF COMBAT-
TING AND CONTROLLING INTERNAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
WHOSE AVOWED PURPOSE IS TO

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TOPPLE THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT. ANY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
THAT MIGHT BE INSTITUTED IN THE FUTURE SHOULD BE CAREFULLY
DESIGNED TO RAISE THE CAPABILITY TO COMBAT INTERNAL TERRORIST
ACTIVITIES WHILE THAT THE SAME TIME PROVIDING REQUESTED TRAINING
AND ASSISTANCE TO EDUCATE THE GOES MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES
IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CARRY-
ING OUT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER.

12. ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES--
J KLOUT DETAILED DISCUSSION OF U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (WHICH
IS CONTAINED IN AID'S FY 1980 ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION) THERE
IS LITTLE POINT IN COVERING ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER SOURCES
IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE. KSSFEINE IT SO SAY THAT
ALL SUCH ASSISTANCE IS GENERALLY DIRECTED TO HELPING RELIEVE
THE BASIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH EMPHASIS ON SATISFYING
BASIC HUMAN NEEDS. THERE IS VERY LITTLE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AS
SUCH FROM OTHER SOURCES. EVEN MILITARY SALES BY SOME OTHER COUNTRIES
HAVE BEEN RESTRAINED BY CONCERN OF THOSE COUNTRIES OVER THE HUMAN
RIGHTS SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR (E.G., UK'S REVERSAL ON SALES
OF ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS). THERE IS A GROWING TENDENCY TO SEEK
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RELATIONSHIPS AND TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES WITH COUNTRIES CONSIDERED MORE SYMPATHETIC TO EL SALVADOR'S SITUATION, ESPECIALLY CHILE AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

13. FY 1980 PROGRAM ASSESSMENT (NOTE: CURRENT LEVELS ARE NOT USED AS THERE IS NO CURRENT IMET OF FMSCR PROGRAM. BASIC LEVELS ARE BASED ON PREVIOUSLY RECOMMENDED LEVELS. ALL FIGURES ARE IN MILLIONS OF COLLARS.) --

A. IMET

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL: .250

(A) DESCRITPON -- THIS FUNDING LEVEL WILL ALLOW THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCE TO OBTAIN THE TOP-PRIORITY TRAINING REQUIREMENTS OF THEIR INCREASINGLY CONUS-ORIENTED TRAINING PROGRAM. OFFICERS WILL ATTEND AIR/ARMY/NAVY COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGS, INFANTRY/ARTILLERY/QUARTERMASTER/SIGNAL ADVANCE, NAVY SUPPLY SCHOOL, USCG OCS, AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND FLIGHT SAFETY OFFICER COURSES.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- THIS LEVEL WILL NOT ALLOW EL SALVADOR TO OBTAIN BADLY-NEEDED FIXED AND ROTARY WING AVIATORS. THEY, LIKE OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES, WILL SEEK THIS TRAINING ELSEWHERE, BUT IT SI DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WILL ACQUIRE QUALIFIED AVIATION PERSONNEL IN THE NUMBERS REQUIRED. EL SALVADOR WILL OPT TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR OBTAINING SORELY-NEEDED PROFESSIONAL TRAINING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL BE ONLY PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL IN THIS EANDEAVOR. THIS LEVEL WILL GIVE THE U.S. AN ABILITY TO INFLUENCE IN CONUS ONLY A VERY FEW OF THE SALVADORAN OFFICERS IN THE U.S. WAY OF LIFE AND OUR PERCEPRION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ASSUMING A CONTINUING EFFORT ON U.S. PART TO PROVIDE SUCH EXPOSURE TO A SIGNIFICANT

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DEGREE DURING THE TRAINING PERIODS. OTHERS WILL BE TRAINED BY COUNTRIES WHOSE IDEALS MAY BE INIMICAL TO OUR OWN.

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: .400

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THIS LEVEL SHOULD, IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRAINING OBTAINED AT THE SEPARATBYY FUNDED CANAL ZONE MILITARY SCHOOLS, MEET THE BULK OF SALVADORAN YEARLY REQUIREMENTS. THE INCREASED LEVEL WILL BE USED ALMOST WHOLLY FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TRAINING AND FIXED/ROTARY WING AVIATOR TRAINING.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- THIS LEVEL WILL MATERIALLY ASSIST THE ARMED FORCE IN THEIR MODEST MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. IT WILL NOT ALLOW FOR THE TRAINING IN THE U.S. OF THOSE OFFICERS WHO WERE MISSED DURING THE MORATORIUM ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND THE ARMED FORCE WILL NEED TO SEEK SOME TRAINING FROM OTHER COUNTRIES FOR THAT PURPOSE.

(3) BASIC LEVEL: .525

(A) DESCRIPTION--THE INCREASE OVER THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL WILL BE USED TO TRAIN SOME OF THE OFFICERS IN CONSUMPTION WHO WOULD, UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES, HAVE BEEN TRAINED IN U.S. SCHOOLS IN THE PAST.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- THIS LEVEL WILL BENEFIT THE ARMED FORCE BY FULFILLING THE ANNUAL TRAINING REQUIREMENT AND BY GIVING BADLY-NEEDED PROFESSIONAL TRAINING TO A FEW OF THE PROMISING YOUNG OFFICERS WHO DID NOT RECEIVE IT IN FY 1978 AND 79. IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION SO WARRANTS, THIS TYPE PROGRAM WILL SHOW APPROVAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS IMPROVEMENTS AND GO A LONG WAY TOWARD RESTORING GOOD WILL LOST IN THE PAST.

B. FMS CREDIT (FMSCR)

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(1) MINIMUM LEVEL: 1.5

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THIS LEVEL WILL ALLOW CONTINUATION OF MINIMUM ARTICLES AND SERVICES SUPPORT NECESSARY TO CONTINUE TRI-SERVICE OPERATIONS.

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(B) ASSESSMENT -- FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL NOT PERMIT THE PROCUREMENT OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT TO REPLACE AGING FOUGA AND OURAGAN AIRCRAFT. THE IMBALANCE THUS CREATED BETWEEN HONDURAN CAPABILITIES (SUPER MYSTERES) AND SALVADORAN CAPABILITIES WILL LEAD TO INCREASING PRESSURE TO UPGRADE THE SALVADORAN AIR FLEET TO A LEVEL COMMENSURATE WITH THAT OF HONDURAS. IF THIS MINIMUM LEVEL IS NOT APPROVED, OPERATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL EFFICIENCY WILL DETERIORATE GRADUALLY DURING THE YEAR. THE NAVY'S CAPABILITIES FOR PATROL, SURVEILLANCE, AND SEARCH AND RESCUE WILL BE SEVERELY DEGRADED. AIR FORCE CARGO-LIFT CAPABILITY FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE, CIVIC ACTION AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCED. COMMUNICATIONS WILL REMAIN MARGINAL.

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: 6.7

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THIS LEVEL WILL PERMIT THE INITIAL PURCHASE OF ONE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT FOR AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND OTHER ARTICLES AND SERVICES FOR SUSTAINED OPERA-
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TIONS AND ADEQUATE MAINTENANCE SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN ARMED FORCES.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- FUNDING AT THIS LEVEL WILL NOT PERMIT THE PURCHASE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN QUANTITIES NEEDED FOR MODERNIZATION OF AGING AIR FLEET, UNLESS PURCHASED FOR CASH THROUGH FMS OR OTHER SOURCES (WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY DETRACT FROM THEIR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN LAND AND SEA FORCES AND PURCHASE NATION BUILDING EQUIPMENT).

(3) BASIC LEVEL: 11.9

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THIS LEVEL WILL ADDITIONALLY PERMIT THE PURCHASE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT IN SUPPORTABLE QUANTITIES (TWO PER YEAR), AND WOULD SATISFY THE ENTIRE RECOMMENDED FMSCR PROGRAM FOR THE COUNTRY FOR FY 1980.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- PURCHASE OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WILL AL-

LEVIATE THE LONG-STANDING PROBLEM OF A MIXED INVENTORY OF OVER-AGE AIRCRAFT. FUNDING OF THE ENTIRE CREDIT FINANCING PROGRAMS WILL PERMIT THE GOVERNMENT TO MODERNIZE THE AIR ARM AT A REASONABLE PACE WHILE ACCOMMODATING THE REQUIREMENTS FOR ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO SUSTAIN LAND AND SEA OPERATIONS.

C. U.S. MILITARY GROUP

(1) MINIMUM LEVEL: TWO OFFICERS, ONE DAC, TWO LWR.

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THIS LEVEL COULD OPERATE ONLY IF THERE IS NEITHER IMET OR FMSCR APPROVED FOR FY 1980. MILITARY PERSONNEL WOULD PRIMARILY PROCESS FMS CASH PURCHASES AS APPROVED ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS; MONITOR ACQUISITION, USE AND DISPOSITION OF U.S. EQUIPMENT; AND INVENTORY AND REPORT ON U.S. MAP EQUIPMENT AS REQUIRED BY CURRENT LEGISLATION.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- THIS LEVEL IS BELOW THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL

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MANNING NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY PERFORM "ACCOUNTING AND OTHER MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS" PRESCRIBED BY LAW AND THE CORRESPONDING ADMINISTRATIVE LOAD REQUIRED. ALL OTHER TRADITIONAL DEFENSE RELATED ROLES WOULD HAVE TO BE DROPPED. THE MILITARY PRESENCE WOULD NOT BE AT A LEVEL COMMENSURATE WITH ITS CAPABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY SECTOR. THIS LEVEL WOULD NOT BE CAPABLE OF PERFORMING MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES IN SUCH AREAS AS ORGANIZATION, FORCE STRUCTURE, LOGISTICS SUPPLY, MAINTENANCE AND MOBILITY. ALSO, THIS LEVEL DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR A MILGP STRUCTURE CAPABLE OF ADMINISTERING THE FMS AND IMET PROGRAMS TO INSURE THAT UPON RESUMPTION THESE INVESTMENTS ARE PROPERLY SAFEGUARDED. THIS LEVEL WILL NOT ALLOW U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TO BE INVOLVED AT THE MANAGEMENT LEVEL OF MAJOR FUNCTIONAL AREAS, THEREFORE FMS PROCUREMENT WILL BECOME A SERIES OF IMPULSIVE BUYS WITHOUT REGARD TO REALISTIC PRIORITIES AND WITHOUT BENEFITS OF OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. MUCH OF THE INTANGIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE ORGANIZATION IN EL SALVADOR COULD BE LOST. LONG-STANDING PROFESSIONAL MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS HAVE GENERATED A RESERVOIR OF INFLUENCE AND GOOD WILL WHICH HAS CONSISTENTLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE ATTAINMENT OF OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THIS VOLATILE REGION. THIS LEVEL OF MILGP MANNING WOULD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINE THE ABILITY TO CONTINUE SUCH RELATIONSHIPS.

(2) INTERMEDIATE LEVEL: THREE OFFICERS, ONE DAC, TWO LWR.

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THE ADDITION OF ONE OFFICER TO THE MINIMUM LEVEL WOULD ALLOW A SLIGHT INCREASE IN THE ABILITY OF THE MILGP TO ADEQUATELY PERFORM "ACCOUNTING AND OTHER MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS" ASSOCIATED WITH FMS. THIS LEVEL COULD OPERATE IF THERE IS A RESUMPTION OF MINIMUM FMSCR, BUT NOT IMET -- OR IF THERE IS A RESUMPTION OF IMET, BUT NO FMS

CREDIT.

(B) ASSESSMENT"" THQYS LEVEL WOULD IMPROVE THE MILGP
ABILITY ONLY SLIGHTLY TO PERFOR MINIMUM MANAGEMENT ADVIS-
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ORY SERVICES AND TO INFLUENCE THE MILITARY SECTOR, ALL
OTHER REMARKS UNDER "MINIMUM LEVEL" APPLY.

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 L-03 H-01
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 OMB-01 NSC-05 TRSE-00
AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 ICA-11 EB-08 COME-00 IO-13
/107 W

-----020123 220351Z /23

R 211830Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8946
INFO AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
AMEMBASSY GUATEMALA
SECDEF WASHDC
USCINCSO

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(3) CURRENT AUTHORIZED LEVEL: THREE OFFICERS, TO DAC,
THREE LWR.

(A) DESCRIPTION -- THIS LEVEL IS THE ABSOLUTE
"BARE BONES" MINIMUM REQUIRED TO ADMINSTER AN IMET PROGRAM AND
A MODEST FMSCR PROGRAM. THE ADDITIONAL
DAC (NOT CURRENTLY ASSIGNED) WOULD BE UTILIZED IN ADMINSTRING
THE IMET AND ENGLISH LANGUAGE TESTING PROGRAMS.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- THIS LEVEL CAN PERFORM THOSE
FUNCTIONS PRESECRIBED BY LAW PERTAININ TO FMS CASH SALES, AND
IS AT A LEVEL CAPABLE OF ADMINISTERING A MODEST FMSCR AND IMET

PROGRAM UPON ITS RESUMPTION.

(4) INCREMENTAL LEVEL: FIVE OFFICERS, TWO DAC, THREE LWR.

(A) DESCRITPON -- THIS LEVEL WOULD BE APPRO-
PRIATE IN THE EVENT THE BASIC LEVEL OF FMSCR (PARA 13B (3)) IS
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APPROVED.

(B) ASSESSMENT -- THIS LEVEL WOULD ALLOW FLEX-
IBILITY NECESSARY TO ADMINISTER THE PROGRAMS, WITH RELATED
MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, AS WELL AS PROVIDE FOR A SPECIALIST IN THE
AREA OF AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, MAINTENANCE AND RELATED AREAS.
ALSO AT THIS LEVEL, THE MILGP WOULD BE CAPABLE OF CON-
TINUING A MILITARY RELATIONSHIP THAT CAN INFLUENCE THE MILITARY
SECTOR IN ATTAINMENT OF OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THIS AREA.

14. AMBASSADOR'S ESTIMATE OF PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS -- THE
U.S. DOES NOT CURRENTLY HAVE A SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR GOES
EXCEPT FOR CASH SALES ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS. THE U.S. SEC-
URITY INTEREST AS STATED IN "AMBASSADOR'S GOALS AND OBJECT-
VIES" (STATE 37147, PARA V) COULD BE BETTER PROMOTED WITH
A RENEWAL OF FMSCR AND IMET PROGRAMS. WITH THAT IN MIND,
AND IN THE EVENT THE HUMAN RIGHTS CLIMATE IN EL SALVADOR WILL BE
CONDUCTIVE TO A PROGRAM IN FY 1980, THE FOLLOWING IS M BEST EST-
IMATE OF PROGRAM LEVEL REQUIREMENTS.

U. MAP -- ALL RESIDUAL PIPELINE MAP MATERIAL
SHOULD BE DELIVERED BEFORE THE BEGINNING OF FY 1980. GOES
HAS THE ABILITY TO PAY, EITHER CASH OR CREDIT, FOR NECESSARY
MILITARY EQUIPMENT. I DO NOT RECOMMEND A RESUMPTION OF THE
MAP PROGRAM.

B. FMSCR -- THE AIR FORCE OF EL SALVADOR IS OVER-AGE AND
FAR BELOW THE CAPABILITY OF ITS NEIGHBORS. GOES HAS A PERCEIVED
NEED TO HAVE AT LEAST AS GOOD AN AIR FORCE AS HONDURAS. THIS
PERCEPTION COULD BECOME REALISTIC IF THE CURR
PO BORDER TALKS
BREAK DOWN. OTHER EQUIPMENT IN THE MILITARY INVENTORY IS
IN DIRE NEED OF REPAIR PARTS AND REPLACEMENT. IT WOULD BE IN
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THE U.S INTEREST IF A REASONABLE BALANCE OF POWER IS ATTAINED
BETWEEN GOES AND GOH AND, AT THE SAME TIME, AN ACCELERATED

ARMS RACE PREVENTED. A BALANCE WOULD CONSIDERABLY LESSEN THE PROBABILITY OF HOSTILITIES OVER THE BORDER PROBLEM. AN ARMS RACE CAN BEST BE CONTROLLED IF THE U.S. PROVIDES THE NECESSARY EQUIPMENT BY LIMITING THE NUMBER AND SOPHISTICATION OF MATERIAL. AN FMSCR LEVEL OF ABOUT \$12 MILLION ANNUALLY THROUGH FY 1982 WOULD PERMIT GOES TO MODERNIZE ITS AIR FORCE TO NEAR PARITY WITH HONDURAS, AND TO SUPPORT LAND AND SEA REQUIREMENTS.

C. IMET -- THIS PROGRAM IS IMPORTANT IN OUR ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE POLITICALLY POWERFUL MILITARY ELEMENT OF EL SALVADOR IN U.S. IDEALS OF DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THIS SMALL COUNTRY CANNOT ECONOMICALLY SUPPORT, IN-COUNTRY, THE SCHOOLS REQUIRED FOR NECESSARY TRAINING. WITHOUT IMET, GOES WILL BE RELUCTANTLY FORCED TO GO TO THIRD COUNTRIES FOR TRAINING BUT THEY PROBABLY WILL NOT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ALL OF THE TRAINING NEEDED. ADDITIONALLY, THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING MAY NOT TEACH IDEALS AMENABLE TO U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA. AN IMET PROGRAM OF \$400,000 ANNUALLY THROUGH FY 1982. WOULD PROVIDE THE MINIMUM TRAINING NECESSARY THAT COULD NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED IN-COUNTRY. THIS EXPENDITURE, RELATIVELY SMALL IN TERMS OF OTHER IMET PROGRAMS, WOULD ENABLE THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN AN IMPORTANT INFLUENCE WITHIN THE MILITARY SECTOR OF EL SALVADOR.

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
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Draft Date: 21 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
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Disposition History: n/a
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